Thesis · 2026

The next ten years of software look more like magazines than platforms.

Generative models collapsed the cost of the hardest part of building software. The bottleneck moved. We think it moved to taste, specificity, and distribution — and almost no one is structured to take advantage.

The last twenty years of software optimized for scale. The shape of a successful company was: one product, sold to as many people as possible, for as long as possible. The unit economics rewarded breadth. Generality was a feature, not a defect.

That shape worked because building software was hard, and so the cost of starting a second product was almost always higher than the cost of stretching the first one to cover more ground. Big companies got bigger; the next product was always a feature in the existing one.

Generative models broke that arithmetic. The expensive part of software is no longer the building. It's deciding what to build, for whom, and getting it in front of them. Three things that don't scale.

§ 01What the shift actually changed

It used to be that the smartest person on a team spent their week shipping the third quarter of a product roadmap. Now that work is a weekend. The bottleneck moved upstream — to taste in choosing the problem, specificity in defining it, and patience in distributing the result.

None of those things are getting cheaper. If anything, they're getting more valuable, because the floor of "things that technically work" is now extremely close to the ceiling of "things you'd actually use".

The expensive part of software is no longer the building. It's deciding what to build, for whom, and getting it in front of them.

§ 02The magazine analogy

A magazine is not a platform. It picks a narrow audience, makes a finite, fully-finished thing, and ships it. The next issue is a different finite, fully-finished thing. The publisher is the persistent entity; the issues come and go.

We think the next decade of software looks more like that than like the platform decade behind us. Small focused tools, made by small teams, sold to people who want exactly that thing. The persistent entity is the studio. The tools come and go under it.

That's not a thesis about scale. Some of these tools will be huge. It's a thesis about shape — about what gets rewarded.

§ 03Why we are structured this way

We are two people. We will probably grow to four. We will not grow to forty.

We don't take outside money for an individual project, because the math of single-project capital — the dilution, the timeline pressure, the "your one good thing has to also be huge" — is exactly wrong for what we want to do. We hold the parent and let the projects exit.

This is unusual. It is also, we think, what good operators of small things will look like in five years.

We identify pain points in AI-disrupted markets and build what closes them. Then we hand them off.

— Operating principle, Aratech 2026
The principles, in order

Four rules. We bend three of them. The first one is non-negotiable.

  1. 01
    Narrow beats broad.

    We only take problems a focused tool can solve outright. No platforms, no suites, no "starting points." If we can't describe the whole product in a single sentence, we don't take it.

  2. 02
    Ship, don't pitch.

    Every project has to be real software, in front of a real user, inside ninety days. We don't write decks for things that don't exist. We don't fundraise on slides for things that don't exist either.

  3. 03
    Owners, not operators.

    We hand each tool off to whoever will operate it best. Usually that isn't us. The exit is part of the design, not an afterthought.

  4. 04
    One team, many projects.

    Aratech is the persistent thing. The projects come and go under it. The studio learns. The studio compounds. The projects don't have to.

Footnotes

¹

"AI-disrupted" is a load-bearing phrase. We mean markets where the unit economics of a workflow have changed by an order of magnitude, not markets where a chatbot is plausible. The first kind is rare. The second kind is loud.

²

By "exit," we mean license or sale to an industry operator who will run the tool longer than we will. We do not mean acquihire. We do not mean an IPO. We mean a clean handover with money attached.

³

There is a small set of tools that, once built, won't have an obvious operator-buyer. We retain those and run them ourselves until one shows up. TidalLock is in that bucket. Herald isn't.

We will be wrong about some of this. The thesis is the part we'd defend in 2030 if you came back to read it. Most things on the internet do not pass that test.

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